Specialists in handling distressed debt amassed tens of billions of dollars to buy up bad loans at steep discounts. The offending institutions who had bought the stuff in the first place would be forced to own up to their mistakes, take their lumps and move on. Meanwhile, those deft enough to clean up the problems would reap their just deserts.
Alas, it was not to be.
Sometime around the middle of 2006, some regulator woke from a decade-long slumber and decided to hazard a look at the balance sheets of America’s largest financial institutions. To his horror, just about every bank in the country would be insolvent, given the going prices for delinquent mortgage debt.
He raced off to tell his boss, who alerted his superior, and so on up the chain until then-Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson got wind of the coming tsunami of losses. Paulson barely flinched, for Wall Street’s top brass was well aware their collective predicament. After all, it was the likes of his former charge, Goldman Sachs (GS), who designed and sold the toxic assets in the first place.
The choice then was simple: Step back and let markets sort out the mess, risking the lives of storied firms like Citigroup (C), Bank of America (BAC) and JPMorgan Chase (JPM) - or latch onto the absurd notion that these institutions were “too big to fail,” and begin a process whereby the American taxpayer's hard-earned nest egg would be used to forestall the inevitable day of reckoning.
We now know how that sad story ends.
Two pieces today, one run by Bloomberg charting the failure of myriad modification programs to address the problem of negative equity, and one in the New York Times documenting the exploits of former Countrywide executives buying distressed debt from the FDIC on the cheap, evidence the abject failure of government efforts to stem the rising tide of foreclosures.
Private investors, the ones best suited to forgiving principal or lowering interest rates to keep a family in their home, were handcuffed by political bumblings. But these programs, by preventing true price discovery in the housing market, have likely achieved their goals of their designers.
Our banking system has buckled, but not broken. The eventually recovery, however, has been pushed well down the line and the cost shoved onto future generations. Those responsible have by in large retained their posts at the institutions deemed “too big to fail,” save a couple token scapegoats tossed to the media wolves.
Meanwhile, the responsible few who did not speculate on their home, did not use credit as a vehicle for illegitimate economic growth and never thought they’d be asked to pick up the tab for those that did, have now been asked to shoulder the burden.
It should come as no surprise that housing prices keep falling -- indeed they must in order for true stabilization to occur. But the slow bleed, the persistent drag on the fundamentals of our economy, is doing more damage under the hood than our wise leaders would care to admit.
Still, they insist the more economic control centralized in Washington, the better. After all, the ones that drove us off this cliff certainly should know how to break the fall.
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